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The best way to address questions about emancipatory political practice, I think, is to 
pose them in terms of political will. Right away, this foregrounds the basic difference 
between the involuntary and the voluntary dimensions of social life, and thus helps 
reduce or transform the one in favor of the other. In every situation where it applies, it 
helps clarify a version of what I take to be the most important question of political 
practice: how can a dominated and coerced group or class of people free themselves 
from this coercion and acquire the power they need to determine their own course of 
action, consciously, deliberately, or “willingly,” in the face of the specific obstacles and 
resistance this course will confront? 
I 
The guiding intuition of this project is that the homely and clichéd phrase, “the will of 
the people,” remains the best way of approaching the question of democratic politics, 
and of making distinctions between genuine and deceptive forms of democracy. In 
direct opposition to oligarchy, genuine democracy means the rule of the people—the 
people as distinct from a privileged few or ruling elite, the people understood as the 
many or as the great majority of the population. Democracy applies in situations where 
the will of the people (however this is formulated or expressed) can overpower the will 
or wills of those few who might seek to exploit, oppress, or deceive them. 
These two vague terms, people and will, are both notoriously difficult to pin 
down. Despite their revolutionary history and implications, both have been yoked to 
reactionary and in some cases ultrareactionary political projects. Taken on their own, 
both terms are now widely considered to be almost indefensible as political categories; 
the notion of will, in particular, has been the object of varied but relentless philosophical 
assault for much of the past century, going back at least to Heidegger’s critique of 
Nietzsche, and recurring in the work of thinkers as varied as Althusser, Derrida, 
Agamben, Deleuze, and many others. I’d like to suggest, however, that the combination 
of these two terms, in the formulation of a will of the people, serves to frame if not 
answer most of the general questions that a theory of emancipatory politics needs to 
address. 
Compared to other, more conventional ways of formulating the question of 
democracy (for instance in terms of state institutions, electoral mechanisms, market 
structures, “civil society,” “liberal values,” and so on), our cliché has a couple of 
advantages. 
First of all, nobody quite knows what it means. Of all the basic concepts at issue 
in modern political theory and philosophy, the notion of a will of the people is perhaps 
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the most indeterminate. Everyone is familiar with the words, and their combination, but 
as things stand today their meaning is quite literally up for grabs, and in the last couple 
of years in particular, it has been invoked in all kinds of ways, and in all kinds of 
situations. 
On the one hand, diplomatic reference to “the will of the people” has long been 
one of the most formulaic turns of phrase in the modern political lexicon. In mainstream 
discussion of current affairs this usually amounts to nothing more than a token nod to 
“formal democratic” mechanisms for ensuring some sort of minimal choice in the 
selection of political representatives. So long as such selection is controlled in ways that 
restrict any challenge to the established order of things, apparent respect for the will of 
the people is an integral aspect of the status quo, and has been so for a long time. Even 
so conservative a constitution as the one described by the French writer Benjamin 
Constant in 1815 “recognizes the principle of the sovereignty of the people, that is, the 
supremacy of the general will over every particular will,”1 and today there is perhaps no 
modern political principle more widely shared than the one that condemns as 
illegitimate any attempt to govern people against their will. It’s in this sense that even so 
aristocratic an oligarch as Winston Churchill might defer to a representation of the 
people’s will,2 and it’s in this sense that presidents of the United States like to remind 
the world they dominate that they “support the democratic aspirations of all people,” 
including a few places “where the will of the people [has] proved more powerful than 
the writ of a dictator.”3 Even the president whom Cornel West memorably derided as “a 
black mascot of Wall Street oligarchs and a black puppet of corporate plutocrats”4 does 
not hesitate to define “self-determination” as “the chance to make of your life what you 
will.”5 
On the other hand, the concentration and assertion of the people’s will has been 
central to the whole modern trajectory of revolutionary practice. From the Jacobin 
constitution of 1793 France through the ANC’s Freedom Charter of 1955 to the new 
Bolivian constitution of 2009 and the Arab revolutions of 2011, a long and versatile 
emancipatory tradition has affirmed the will of the people as the basis of political action 
and legitimacy. The ANC’s Charter, for instance, before it denounces apartheid, racism, 
and social inequality, opens with the assertion that “no government can justly claim 
authority unless it is based on the will of all the people,” and insists as its first demand: 
“The People shall govern!” National liberation movements from Algeria to Zimbabwe 
took shape around a similar “will to independence.”6 The 2011 uprisings in Tunisia and 
Egypt, likewise, crystallized around a literal assertion of the people’s will, expressed in 
the innumerable variations of the slogan that has already transformed the Middle East: 
“the people want to topple the regime.”7 Reference to emancipatory political will is also 
essential to the political theory and practice of a wide range of revolutionary thinkers, 
from Robespierre and Saint-Just through Lenin and Gramsci to Mao and Fanon. Insofar 
as what is at stake is the empowerment of people to determine their own destiny and 
their own political program, Tony Benn is right to insist that democracy remains the 
most revolutionary program of all, “the most revolutionary thing in the world.”8 
This uncertainty in the status of our phrase gives it a unique strategic purchase. 
Unlike concepts that are more directly associated with orthodox Marxist or Communist 
traditions, reference to the will of the people evokes a revolutionary practice that also 
retains a thoroughly “mainstream” significance. 
A second and more important advantage stems from the peculiar and 
problematic conjunction of the two terms in question: “people” and “will.” If we leave 
the partial exception of ancient Athens to one side, the connection of these two notions 
was scarcely thinkable before the world was “turned upside down” by the Levellers, 
Diggers, and other egalitarian mobilizations during the English revolution of the 1640s, 
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and among the privileged classes it has remained the primary source of political anxiety 
ever since. Although important initial contributions were made by early modern thinkers 
like Machiavelli and Hobbes, I think that it’s only with Rousseau that the notion of a 
collective or “general” will began to receive adequate theoretical definition. It is only 
with Rousseau’s Jacobin admirers, furthermore, during the French and Haitian 
revolutions, that such a notion came to orient political practice, and it is only after Marx 
that such practice gained the sort of historical determination required to give it far-
reaching strategic purchase on a situation. If we can clarify what is meant by these 
elusive terms “people” and “will,” and what their combination requires and implies, 
then we may also clarify what is required to move from merely formal to actual 
democracy. 
My hypothesis is that their conjunction is enough all by itself to provide a 
normative basis for democratic practice, and thus for the political project of changing a 
world ruled by and for the few into a world ruled by and for the many. Precisely on 
account of their generic and transhistorical quality, these terms offer a useful basis for 
getting a grip on a wide range of situations. Compared with emancipatory perspectives 
that filter the category of the people through preexisting categories of identity, 
occupation, or history, or with conceptions of volition filtered through (or displaced by) 
notions of instinct, intellect, appetite, affect, or communication, the terms will and 
people are as wide-ranging and versatile as the notions of empowerment and liberation 
themselves. 
It’s equally important to stress, however, that they also prescribe a certain 
specificity. The category of “the people,” as is well known, is always bound up with the 
tension between abstract inclusion (the people simply as everyone, or as the whole 
population, the “realm” or nation as a more or less harmonious totality) and concrete 
exclusion (whereby the category of the people excludes those “enemies” who exploit, 
oppress, or dominate them); it is only through its articulation with concrete political 
practice that its orientation is decided, in one direction or the other. The practice of 
political will likewise mediates the norm of free self-determination and the necessity to 
engage with the constraints that inhibit popular participation in such determination, the 
obstacles or tendencies that might divide, isolate, or deceive those who seek to 
formulate and impose their will. 
Will and people: rejecting the merely formal, that is, oligarchic conceptions of 
democracy that disguise the established balance of class power, a genuinely or literally 
democratic politics can be described as the effort to think and practice one term through 
the other. On the one hand, a will of the people must of course involve association and 
collective action, and will depend on a capacity to invent and preserve forms of 
inclusive assembly (e.g., through demonstrations, meetings, unions, parties, networks, 
websites, and so on). If an action is prescribed by popular will, on the other hand, then 
what’s at stake is a free or voluntary course of action, decided on the basis of informed 
and reasoned deliberation. Since there’s no agreement on the meaning of the term will 
(or even on its very existence), its usage calls for some further clarification. 
By “will” I mean, first of all, the actual exercise of willing a particular purpose 
or end. For precisely this reason I will prefer the generic term actor over the term 
“subject,” since it avoids or recasts some of the well-known ambiguities of latter (as 
both agent and substrate, active and passive, free and “subjected,” and so on) in favor of 
a direct derivation from the verb to act, a verb whose own ambiguity is productive and 
illuminating. To will is a practical rather than theoretical matter, and as a matter of 
practice it involves direct participation, action, and effort on the part of its subject or 
actor, undertaken as deliberate and purposeful (rather than conceived as an “authentic” 
expression of an essence or identity). There is an essential difference between active 
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involvement in an act of willing and its representation, measurement, or interpretation 
by external observers. 
There is likewise an essential difference between voluntary and involuntary 
kinds of action. Unlike an involuntary action or movement, for instance a movement 
determined by a reflex or instinct, or one that has become routine by force of repetition 
or habit, and unlike action that is coerced or compelled, a voluntary or willed action is 
more or less freely chosen, intended, and sustained, on the basis of more or less well-
informed rational deliberation. (As opposed to a metaphysical understanding of the will 
as endowed with a kind of absolute or quasi-divine freedom, the freedom at issue is 
indeed always a matter of “more of less,” since freedom is also to be understood here as 
a practice, as a process of freeing or emancipating—a practice through which actors 
liberate themselves, more or less, from the various constraints they confront, and 
thereby acquire a degree of autonomy). 
The kinds of purpose at issue in an act of will are also more or less distinct from 
those involved with mere impulses of whim or wish. Whereas much of the scholarly 
work done on the problem of free will might better be described as reflection on “free 
whim,” the notion of political will that interests me, and that has its roots in Rousseau 
and in Machiavelli, instead associates will and “virtue” with power and the capacity to 
act. Unlike mere whim or wish, or the simple expression of an opinion or preference, to 
will a purpose is itself to embark on the course of action that may realize it, in spite of 
the obstacles and vagaries of fortune it must confront. No doubt the difference here is 
more a matter of dialectical transition than of categorical distinction: a certain quantity 
of wish, so to speak, may well cross the qualitative threshold that separates it from will. 
But once this threshold is crossed, in ways that will vary with the situation and the 
obstacles involved, then the old truisms remain true: where there’s a will there’s a way, 
so long as those who will the end will the means. 
Examples of the sort of egalitarian political will I have in mind are easy to list: 
along with the Bolivarian projects of Latin America and the recent mobilizations in 
north Africa (along with, on what remains for the time being a more modest scale, the 
anti-neoliberal demonstrations across Europe and much of the world), they could 
include the political determination of South Africa’s United Democratic Front, Haiti’s 
Lavalas, and Palestine’s Intifada to confront forms of inequality and injustice based on 
race, culture, privilege, and class. For me the most instructive examples remain the great 
revolutions that took place in France and Haiti, and then in Russia, China, and Cuba, 
along with the anticolonial liberation movements that drew much of their inspiration 
from these revolutions. 
In each case, a threshold is crossed when the actors in these sequences apply a 
version of Danton’s principle, later cited by Engels, Lenin, and many others: “de 
l’audace, de l’audace, encore de l’audace!”9 In each case, a decisive element in the 
struggle is the respective actors’ capacity and willingness to act—the capacity of those 
who control the economic levers of power and the repressive machinery of the state, on 
the one hand, versus the people’s collective capacity to act deliberately and forcefully in 
pursuit of common goals on the other hand. When a struggle reaches a decisive point, 
those waging it must decide between fright and fight. Anyone involved in a popular 
struggle knows that if we are to continue to fight, and to fight to win, then we need to 
maintain solidarity and unity, to resist fragmentation and dispersal, to invent forms of 
discipline and organization, and to encourage means of leadership that are both 
responsive and decisive. A popular mobilization prevails when its sense of purpose is 
strong and its principles are clear, and when it is prepared to take the steps needed to 
apply them. As Frederick Douglas realized early in a long cycle of antiimperialist 
struggle, “power concedes nothing without a demand”10—but by the same token, as the 
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Vietnamese general Vo Nguyen Giáp argued later in that same cycle, when a popular 
demand is clear, conscious, and well organized, when it is made with “unshakeable 
conviction,” then it commands “invincible strength” and can “overcome all difficulties 
and hardships to defeat an enemy who at first was several times stronger.”11 Along the 
way, uncounted numbers of people struggling against all sorts of powerful enemies have 
repeated the slogan that prevails whenever it is put into practice with the determination 
it requires: “the people, united, will never be defeated!” Popular determination, in the 
past, has put an end to slavery, colonialism, child labor, and apartheid; only similar 
determination can, in the future, put an end to capitalist exploitation, imperialist 
oppression, nuclear proliferation, and environmental catastrophe. 
II 
I’m currently trying to tackle this cluster of ideas and historical sequences from two 
angles: one broadly synthetic and the other more genealogical. The synthetic project is 
intended to be a somewhat systematic study of the notion and practice of the will of the 
people as such, with sections devoted to accounts of the people on the one hand and of 
the will on the other, along with the most fruitful attempts to think them together, for 
instance via the effort made by Marx and Blanqui, followed by Luxemburg, Lenin, and 
their contemporaries, to think the notion of a resolute, determined, and autonomous 
proletariat, as the “leading edge” of a mobilization in pursuit of the political and 
economic emancipation of the people as a whole. This project also includes some 
discussion of several of the essential practices that figure as conditions for the organized 
exercise of such a political will: practices of association, combination, and assembly 
(for instance in the Jacobin clubs, or municipal sections of the French Revolution, in 
trade unions, workers’ councils, and political parties, in the ti legliz and base ecclesial 
communities of liberation theology, and so on); practices of education, information, 
deliberation, and debate, that allow for the formulation and assertion of collective 
priorities, goals, and decisions; practices that enable these decisions to be imposed and 
these goals to be realized, in the face of whatever opposition they might encounter from 
more privileged members of the situation; practices that encourage the cultivation of a 
collective spirit, discipline, and courage (practices that Rousseau, followed by, e.g., 
Mao and Che, described in terms of political “virtue”), to counter the inevitable 
tendencies that encourage the pursuit of private, factional, or divisive interests; practices 
that enable a popular political will to persevere as united (but not uniform), determined 
(but not dogmatic), self-critical (but not cynical), steadfast (but not rigid), and so on. 
Several broad suppositions underlie this approach to emancipatory politics. One 
is that the conscious and deliberate intentions of the actors are an important (though 
certainly not the exclusive) factor in the determination of political struggle. This factor 
has been systematically downplayed if not dismissed by many of the most innovative 
figures in continental philosophy, ever since the turn against Sartre and existentialism in 
the early 1960s—and in many ways, ever since the turn away from the voluntarist 
conceptions of moral and political philosophy defended, in various ways, by Rousseau, 
Kant, and Hegel, but then rejected by figures as diverse as Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, 
Wittgenstein, Stalin, and his epigones, the later Heidegger, Deleuze, Derrida, and so on. 
Any analysis of imperial and neocolonial policies, for instance, or of neoliberal policies, 
or of the policies that in recent years have targeted the labor movement, immigrant 
workers, antiimperialist “insurgents,” and so on, that doesn’t/don’t pay attention to the 
perfectly explicit, perfectly deliberate intentions of the actors involved, has no chance of 
grasping the class and power dynamics involved—and the same goes, of course, for the 
emancipatory movements resisting these policies. 
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In the absence of any “neutral” means of deciding the issue, the sort of 
voluntarism I’m defending here implies a readiness to treat both oppressive and 
emancipatory processes less as reflections of “objective tendencies” or “systemic laws” 
than as more or less deliberate strategies conceived by conscious and specific actors, 
albeit in circumstances that are forced upon rather than chosen by them. Against the 
theoretical reflexes that have long dominated the human sciences in general and 
contemporary European philosophy in particular, this approach involves recognition 
that no adequate account of political action can proceed without considering its 
“psychological” or psychopolitical dimension, and without addressing the hopes and 
motivations of the actors themselves. It involves a willingness to listen to the reasons 
actors give for acting the way they do, before jumping to the conclusion that these 
reasons simply mask “deeper” (unconscious, involuntary, ideological, and so on) forms 
of determination. It accepts that some kinds of situation are only intelligible from the 
perspective of those who are engaged in the process of its transformation, and that 
people should be treated as the “authors and actors of their own drama,” rather than as 
puppets subjected to the play of forces they cannot understand.12 
A second and equally self-evident supposition is that the actors who seek to 
exploit and dominate target groups or populations usually go to a good deal of trouble to 
disguise their intentions, and to control the way they are represented in what passes for 
the public means of information and education. The ideal form of domination, of course, 
is one that can be represented, and perhaps even lived, as “voluntarily” accepted by 
those it targets, and thus not as a form of domination at all. The genius of capitalism, as 
the coercive “command of unpaid labor,”13 is that despite its violent origins and 
premises its coercion eventually comes to take on an apparently free or voluntary form, 
as mediated by the labor market, in which buyers and sellers appear to meet on an 
“equal” footing. The genius of “humanitarian” forms of imperial intervention—for 
instance as recently perfected by the “donor” countries who have long controlled Haiti’s 
economy and government—likewise focuses on the apparent dependence and presumed 
gratitude of its beneficiaries, their need to be “protected” from home-grown political 
projects that might threaten the status quo. 
A third supposition turns on the relationship between a will and its 
consequences, and qualifies the primacy of willed intention. Even so austere a political 
voluntarist as Saint-Just understood, of course, that “the force of circumstance [la force 
des choses] may lead us to results that we never thought of” (February 26, 1793). To 
insist on the importance of deliberate intention and conscious purpose is not to pretend 
that intentions alone might determine what happens over a course of action. An 
intention is not the virtual blueprint for a series of deeds that simply brings it to fruition 
in actuality. To will an end or outcome is not to will a fully formed solution in advance 
of engaging with the problem; it is rather the readiness to follow through on a decision 
and the principles that orient it, the willingness to do what is required to overcome the 
obstacles, both predictable and unforeseen, that may emerge over the course of its 
imposition. If to will the end is also to will the means, then participation in a political 
will is participation in the effort, which is invariably specific to a particular situation of 
struggle, to align means and ends in the way that appears to promise maximum 
conformity of the former to the latter. A will cannot dictate its consequences in advance, 
but the people who affirm it can be more or less capable of following the partially 
contingent sequence of its consequences, and of doing what is necessary to see them 
through, without falling prey to dogmatic rigidity on the one hand or opportunistic 
compromises on the other. 
A further presumption concerns the nature of the actor or subject of political 
will. I take the capacity to will to be a universal and thoroughly ordinary human ability, 
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like the capacity to speak or think, an ability whose most fundamental conditions of 
possibility stem from the way that we evolved as a species. Among other things, this 
evolution dictates that the actor who speaks, thinks, or wills is an individual (rather than 
a group) while at the same time ensuring that willing individuals are always more or 
less “grouped,” in keeping with the commonplace idea that human individuals are 
always constitutively and irreducibly social. There is then a kind of continuum, one that 
crosses multiple thresholds of scale and capacity, between individual and collective acts 
of will. “The individual is the element of humanity,” as Blanqui argues, “like the stitch 
in a piece of knitting”—without willing and politically educated individuals nothing is 
possible, but if the political fabric they form is too lose or shapeless then when it comes 
to social or economic struggles such isolated individuals are reduced to impotence.14 
Only individuals can will, but as a matter of course only organized groups of individual 
have the capacity to engage in a political will, and thus challenge the terms of their 
employment, confront the class of people who exploit them, or struggle with those who 
dominate them. 
Running through all these assumptions is the correlation of will and capacity, the 
capacities to deliberate with others, to formulate an end, follow its consequences, and so 
on. The second of the two projects I’m currently engaged in aims to unpack these 
assumptions and to explore the link between will and capacity. There are lots of ways 
you could try to do this, but for the time being I’ve decided that the most economical 
way is to focus on what I take to be the three most important figures to have contributed 
to the modern practice of emancipatory politics—Rousseau, Blanqui, and Marx. 
III 
By framing the theoretical roots of political will in terms of this trio, I mean to 
emphasize the fact that no single philosopher or political thinker provides an adequate 
account of its practice, or deserves to be taken as a sufficient guide on their own. 
Rousseau, Blanqui, and Marx differ in many ways, of course, and sometimes 
spectacularly so. Nevertheless, I hope to show that they can be productively read as 
contributions to a common project, and that taken together they provide the most 
concise way of laying the foundations for a general account of political will in this 
activist and emancipatory sense. Of course many other thinkers should be added to 
create a more complete list (for instance Machiavelli, Kant, Robespierre, Marat, Fichte, 
Babeuf, and so on), but I’ve chosen these particular three, beyond their canonical status 
and their direct influence on other figures, because together they seem to offer, with a 
minimum of direct overlap, the most forceful and suggestive way of framing the issue. 
On both historical and conceptual grounds, Rousseau clearly figures as the first, 
most fundamental figure of this modern tradition, insofar as he posits as a primary and 
irreducible point of departure that “the principle of every action is in the will of a free 
being,” such that “it is not the word freedom which means nothing; it is the word 
necessity.”15A person’s freedom, Rousseau concludes, “doesn’t consist in doing merely 
what he wills or wants, but rather in never doing what he does not want to do.”16 It is 
the constitutive alignment of willing and doing, which has to be worked out through 
practice and experiment, that establishes the ground for a collective and egalitarian 
notion of freedom. Rousseau then sketches a normative account of political community 
and social justice on the basis of this principle, a sketch that Robespierre and Marat, 
along with a host of other Jacobins and sans-culottes, would soon strive to put into 
revolutionary practice.17 Against the many variations of the argument that downplay the 
significance of the French revolution, and that try either to limit their implications or 
confine them to an outdated historical moment, I side with those who affirm it as the 
inauguration of a revolutionary period that remains open to this day, and in particular as 
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the initiation of what might be called a “Jacobin-Bolshevik” project whose significance, 
however battered and maligned over recent decades, is far from exhausted. 
If Robespierre emerged as the dominant political figure of the Jacobin phase of 
the French Revolution it’s because he understood most clearly why, to accomplish its 
goals, “we need a single will, ONE will [une volonté UNE],” the will of the people in 
general—and since the main resistance to such a general will “comes from the 
bourgeois” so then Robespierre recognized that “to defeat the bourgeois we must rally 
the people.”18 After Robespierre, Saint-Just summarized the whole Jacobin political 
project when he rejected “purely speculative” or “intellectual” conceptions of justice, as 
if “laws were the expression of taste rather than of the general will.” The only legitimate 
basis for autonomous self-determination, from this perspective, is instead “the material 
will of the people, its simultaneous will; its goal is to consecrate the active and not the 
passive interest of the greatest number of people.”19 In the wake of Thermidorian 
reaction, Babeuf quickly realized that the “first and crucial step” toward a more equal 
distribution of resources and opportunities was “the achievement of a truly effective 
democracy through which the people’s will could be expressed.”20 
After Babeuf and Buonarrati, Blanqui again adopts the ends and means of this 
neo-Jacobin project, and his lifelong effort “to continue the revolution” is first and 
foremost a confrontation with the specific obstacles that now prevent conversion of la 
volonté du peuple into a sovereign political reality. Considered as a revolutionary 
activist, Marx shares rather more with Blanqui than most recent critics acknowledge. 
Although Marx is more concerned with the socioeconomic dimensions of this 
conversion, of course, if we read him as a political theorist then Lucio Colletti isn’t far 
off the mark when he suggests that Marx adds little or “nothing to Rousseau, except for 
the analysis (which is of course rather important) of the ‘economic basis’ for the 
withering away of the state.”21 
We might say that Rousseau imagines an autonomous community governed by a 
general will; Blanqui considers the steps that need to be taken in order to actualize it; 
and Marx considers the historical and economic tendencies that may enable or 
discourage the taking of these steps. In terms of what they contribute to a general theory 
of revolutionary emancipation, then, these three contributions are best understood in a 
way that inverts their chronological order: it is Marx who reconstructs the roots and 
causes of a popular revolution, Blanqui who considers what is needed to trigger and 
sustain one, and Rousseau who ponders its consequences and continuation. 
Or else, to risk a still more abstract formulation: Rousseau considers aspects of 
our capacity to act, the constitution of a collective actor, and the determination of a 
common purpose (the who and the why of action); Marx considers the conditions and 
tendencies that enable or discourage emancipatory political action (its where and when); 
and Blanqui considers the taking of action itself (what it involves and how it might 
prevail). 
Although much recent work on Rousseau remains preoccupied by his allegedly 
authoritarian inclinations (and the consequent problems this poses for trying to read him 
as compatible with approaches he heartily detests: parliamentary democracy and free-
market liberalism), I hope that few readers will dispute his foundational place in this 
wider project. Blanqui too, although marginalized for more than a century, as much by a 
certain Marxist tradition as by more “moderate” forms of republicanism, is a relatively 
obvious choice. Although certainly not as thorough, original, or influential a thinker as 
Rousseau or Marx, and despite the clear limits and ambiguity of some of his positions, 
Blanqui deserves to be rescued from neglect because he poses with unrivalled force the 
essential question of revolutionary politics—the question of taking and retaining the 
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political power that alone can change a society structured in dominance and oppression. 
Although they may not have known it (or been willing to admit it), the next generation 
of revolutionary activists, the generation of Luxemburg, Lenin, Trotsky, and Gramsci 
(to say nothing of Mao, Che or Giáp), followed Blanqui almost as much as they did 
Marx.22 
The association of Marx with any kind of voluntarism may be more 
controversial. As his every reader knows, Marx is certainly critical of the sort of 
“merely” political will he associates, in different places, with Robespierre, Hegel, or 
Bauer, and with some of Blanqui’s own supporters in exile. There are also aspects of 
Marx’s own work that in my opinion go too far in the opposite, antivoluntarist, 
direction, and that help to justify some of the recurring attempts to dismiss him as guilty 
of a reductive sociohistorical determinism. One-sided emphasis on the ways that “social 
being determines consciousness,” if not corrected by consideration of political practice 
and organization, sometimes encourages Marx to downplay questions of proletarian 
agency and purpose in favor of an analysis of “what the proletariat is, and what, in 
accordance with this being, it will historically be compelled to do.”23 Marx rarely 
worries that proletarian actors might think and act in ways that could conflict with the 
underlying tendencies shaping their proletarian being and “forcing” them into 
revolutionary conflict with those who exploit them.24 A similar confidence will enable 
him to assume, with remarkable brevity and nonchalance, that “capitalist production 
begets its own negation with the inexorability of a natural process.”25 There is no 
denying the problematic consequences of this side of his legacy. 
Nevertheless, along with others who have argued that Marx is more concerned 
with political possibility than with historical necessity, I hope to show that his most 
fundamental concerns can be traced back to precisely that central relation of freedom 
and necessity which Hegel and Kant inherited from Rousseau. The young Marx insists 
on the distinctive way that, unlike other animals, “man makes his life activity itself an 
object of his will and consciousness,”26 and in a crucial chapter of Capital the older 
Marx insists on comparable terms on man’s “sovereign power” and capacity to “change 
his own nature,” his ability consciously and deliberately to determine his own ends, and 
to sustain the disciplined, “purposeful will” required to realize them.27 The young Marx 
likewise insists on “the self-determination of the people,”28 and emphasizes the unique 
virtues of democracy as the political form of a fully “human existence,” in which “the 
law exists for the sake of man” rather than vice versa,29 and is formulated as “the 
conscious expression of the will of the people, and therefore originates with it and is 
created by it”30; the older Marx will embrace the Paris Commune of 1871 (inspired and 
organized in large part by Blanqui’s supporters) as an exemplary instance of precisely 
this sort of democracy in action. Understood from this perspective, political decisions 
are in no sense limited to passively registering changes that occur at the level of the 
material “base” of social life. Among other things, the Commune illustrates our capacity 
to invent a political lever that can wedge its way “underneath” this very base, “a lever 
for uprooting the economical foundation upon which rests the existence of classes, and 
therefore of class rule.”31 The base itself, moreover, is both shaped by the irreducibly 
political inflection of class relations, and sustained by the irreducibly “human” and thus 
purposeful and inventive character of the forces of production. At least during periods 
of revolutionary opportunity, as in 1871, or 1848–1850, what is primary is not some sort 
of inexorable historical determinism so much as the taking of vigorous and lucid action, 
carried out by an independent, resolute, and fully conscious political actor, on the model 
of another (temporarily) fruitful collaboration between supporters of both Marx and 
Blanqui: the Communist League.32 
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Early and late, Marx understands communism as “the true appropriation of the 
human essence through and for man,” and “the true resolution of the conflict [. . .] 
between freedom and necessity.”33 What is at stake in the revolutionary transition from 
capitalism to communism is the “development of all human powers as such,”34 together 
with “the control and conscious mastery of these powers, which, born of the action of 
men on one another, have till now overawed and governed men as powers completely 
alien to them.”35 Once we understand the way we shape our social relations, Engels 
adds, “it depends only upon ourselves to subject them more and more to our own will, 
and, by means of them, to reach our own ends [. . .]. Man’s own social organization, 
hitherto confronting him as a necessity imposed by Nature and history, now becomes 
the result of his own free action,” and confirms “the ascent of man from the kingdom of 
necessity to the kingdom of freedom.”36 
With far more depth and precision than Rousseau or Blanqui, Marx also exposes 
how capitalist forms of coercion take on an apparently “voluntary” form, and shows, 
once it has completed the brutal work of its “originary accumulation,” how capital’s 
“command of unpaid labor” binds it not with the flagrant chains of slavery but with the 
“invisible threads” and “silent compulsion” of dependence and precarity.37 Marx helps 
us to understand how modern forms of coercion move beyond mere strategies of overt 
exclusion and direct domination, to encompass more subtle manipulations of our will 
itself. In doing so he frames what remains the central problem for a contemporary 
account of political will: how might we challenge forms of servitude and oppression 
that are represented, in the prevailing neoliberal order of things, as the very form of 
freedom? If the most salient historical developments of the last 30 or so years have 
involved, in almost every part of the world, the massive transfer of power and resources 
from the relatively poor to the relatively rich, perhaps the most far-reaching aspect of 
these developments is the way their advocates have managed to induce large numbers of 
people to accept and even to embrace them as necessary and unavoidable. Until we 
renew our capacity for political will, we will have no convincing answer to the dreary 
refrain: “there is no alternative.” 
IV 
Considered in terms of the contribution they make to an understanding of the practice of 
political will, if read in isolation each of these three thinkers appears one-sided and 
incomplete. Rousseau affirms the freedom and power of a popular or general will, but 
(anticipating Kant) relies too much on the abstract determination of “pure” will as such, 
and downplays the historical and economic context in which it takes shape and operates. 
Marx emphasizes “developmental” factors (following Hegel), to the occasional 
detriment of political action and intention. Rousseau tends to presume too much of pure 
volition and intention, and Marx can rely too much on the course of historical 
development. Blanqui stakes everything on the immediate pursuit of justice and 
equality, but without doing enough to consider either its relationship to the people and 
popular organization on the one hand or its historico-material determinants on the other. 
What is needed today is less the renewal of Marxism per se, and still less of Blanquism 
or Rousseauism (or of Leninism, Maoism, or any other proper-name-ism), so much as 
the construction of a more robust and assertive political voluntarism in general, that is, 
an account of the emancipation from necessity that is fully prepared to foreground its 
partial but decisive dependence on a whole series of political–psychological factors, 
including purpose, intention, consciousness, deliberation, and volition. If it is to prevail 
and endure, the movement from necessity to freedom must itself be freely undertaken. 
Taken in isolation, Rousseau, Blanqui, and Marx all have clear limitations, but 
taken together, I think it’s not much of an exaggeration to say that they anticipate most 
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of the concepts and concerns of a whole series of subsequent voluntarist political 
thinkers, including for instance Lenin, Trotsky, Serge, Gramsci, Mao, Sartre, Che, 
Fanon, Giáp, Dussel, Bensaïd, Badiou, and so on. For all the obvious differences in 
context and priority, there is a striking degree of internal consistency along this 
voluntarist line of political thought (so long as we don’t try to trace it back to a single 
foundational thinker). There are few significant political concepts developed by Lenin 
or Mao, for instance, that weren’t anticipated by either Marx, Rousseau, or Blanqui, and 
both of them are better understood through the lens of this triple and thoroughly 
integrated influence than simply as orthodox Marxists. Although it would be a sterile 
and reductive exercise to try to read them as mere variations in a paradigm, of course, I 
think it would be easy to show how Fanon and Che renew certain motifs in Rousseau, or 
Bensaïd and Badiou some motifs in Blanqui, and so on, in each case conditioned by 
particularities of context and priority. Overall, the underlying continuity is more 
significant, with these and other comparable figures, than their (otherwise noteworthy) 
innovations and peculiarities. 
Gramsci is perhaps the most suggestive and fertile instance of this triple legacy, 
if we can call it that. Gramsci seeks, in terms that seem to draw as much on Rousseau 
and Blanqui as on Marx or Lenin, “to put the ‘will,’ which in the last analysis equals 
practical or political activity, at the base of philosophy.”38 Reality itself is best 
understood as “a product of the application of human will to the society of things,” so 
“if one excludes all voluntarist elements [. . .] one mutilates reality itself. Only the man 
who wills something strongly can identify the elements which are necessary to the 
realisation of his will.”39 In a more specifically Marxist sense, Gramsci explains, “will 
means consciousness of ends, which in turn implies having an exact notion of one’s 
own power, and the means to express it in action.” Participation in such a will implies a 
capacity to determine and pursue our “specific ends, without deviations or hesitations. It 
means cutting a straight and direct path through to the ultimate end, without detours into 
the green meadows of happy brotherhood”40 and the false community of the “realm.” 
No less than Rousseau, Gramsci knows that “before it can be physical, 
movement must always be intellectual” and that “every action is the result of various 
wills, with a varying degree of intensity and awareness and of homogeneity with the 
entire complex of the collective will.”41 As they combine through forms of assembly 
and association to “forge a social, collective will,” Gramsci anticipates that people will 
eventually gain the ability to “control economic facts with their will, until this collective 
will becomes the driving force of the economy, the force which shapes reality itself, so 
that objective reality becomes a living, breathing force, like a current of molten lava, 
which can be channelled wherever and however the will directs.”42 
No less than Blanqui, Gramsci puts his “faith [in] man, and man’s will and his 
capacity for action,”43 and defines man as “concrete will, that is, the effective 
application of the abstract will or vital impulse to the concrete means which realise such 
a will.”44 Gramsci understands partisan political struggle as “a conscious struggle for a 
precise, determinate end: it is a lucid act of the will, a discipline already forged within 
the mind and the will,” one that allows “workers in the Party [to] become an industrial 
vanguard within the workers’ State, just as they are a revolutionary vanguard in the 
period of struggle for the introduction of proletarian power.”45 
No less than Marx, finally, Gramsci knows that if “society does not pose itself 
problems for whose solution the material preconditions do not already exist,” 
acceptance of this proposition “immediately raises the problem of the formation of a 
collective will”: 
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In order to analyse critically what this proposition means, it is necessary to study precisely how 
permanent collective wills are formed, and how such wills set themselves concrete short-term 
and long-term ends—that is, a line of collective action. It is a question of more or less long 
processes of development, and rarely of sudden, “synthetic” explosions. [. . .] It requires an 
extremely minute, molecular process of exhaustive analysis in every detail, the documentation 
for which is made up of an endless quantity of books, pamphlets, review and newspaper articles, 
conversations and oral debates repeated countless times, and which in their gigantic aggregation 
represent this long labour which gives birth to a collective will with a certain degree of 
homogeneity—with the degree necessary and sufficient to achieve an action which is 
coordinated and simultaneous in the time and the geographical space in which the historical 
event takes place.46 
There is no better way to begin the renewal of such study and analysis, I think, than by 
recalling its point of departure in the political philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. 
This will be my priority for the coming months, to be followed in quick succession by 
brief studies of Blanqui and Marx. After this, I hope, I should be in a better position to 
work out a more synthetic account of political will in general, and to head off some of 
the objections that might be leveled at a politics of prescription. 
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